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ABSTRACT
Ultra High Definition (UHD) is one of the emerging
immersive video technologies already available to public,
as even some of the smartphones are capable of capturing
UHD video. The increasingly widespread availability of
UHD capable recording devices has important implications
on privacy. This paper addresses the problem by proposing a
publicly available UHD video dataset designed for evaluation
of privacy issues. The dataset depicts typical surveillance
scenarios of people fighting, exchanging bags, walking, and
stealing, in an indoor and outdoor environment. The dataset
also includes the data from the subjective assessment, which
evaluated the impact of UHD on privacy compared to a cur-
rently common High Definition (HD) video and declining
Standard Definition (SD) video. The results of the assess-
ment not only demonstrate that UHD is a significantly more
privacy intrusive technology when compared to HD and SD
used today, but they also quantify the impact of intrusiveness.
Index Terms— Dataset, UHD video, video surveillance,
privacy evaluations, subjective study
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent adoption of digital video surveillance systems, espe-
cially in public spaces and communities, has significantly in-
creased the concern for intrusion into individual privacy. New
visual sensing technologies, such as Ultra High Definition
(UHD) video capture, threaten to eradicate boundaries of pri-
vate space even more. UHD TV sets and cameras are already
available in stores and even some smartphones, e.g., Samsung
Galaxy Note 3, are capable of recording UHD video. There-
fore, it is normal to assume that UHD is likely to be adopted
by video surveillance systems in the nearest future. However,
the degree to which UHD exposes privacy is little studied and
is not well understood.
To understand the implications of using UHD video in
video surveillance, a dataset suitable for privacy evaluation is
necessary. Existing public UHD datasets are mostly designed
for evaluation of video compression and do not carry privacy
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sensitive information. And datasets dedicated to the evalua-
tion of privacy issues, such as PEViD [1], contain at most HD
video sequences.
To remedy this problem, we created a publicly available
UHD video dataset PEViD-UHD1 designed specifically for
evaluation of privacy. The dataset consists of 26 video se-
quences, each 13 seconds long, with a frame resolution of
3840 × 2160 pixels and captured at 30 fps using a Samsung
Galaxy Note 3 smartphone. The design principles given in [1]
were applied when building the dataset, which makes it gen-
eral enough to reflect different aspects of privacy and allows
the evaluation of protection tools for facial, as well as, for
other visual features that can reveal information about race,
gender, height, personal identifiable items and accessories,
gait, etc.
Video sequences in the proposed dataset depict several
typical surveillance scenarios: walking, exchanging bags,
fighting, and stealing, which were shot in outdoor and indoor
environments. Participants appearing in the video have var-
ious gender and race, they are dressed differently and carry
various personal items and accessories. Their silhouettes
were manually annotated and the annotations are provided in
XML format. All participants have read and signed a con-
sent form, allowing free usage of these video sequences for
research purposes.
A specific property of this dataset that highlights, in terms
of privacy, the difference between UHD and a typical HD
video, is that the action scenes were shot from far away (see
snapshot examples in Figure 1). The aim is to demonstrate
that an important privacy-related details remain visible at dis-
tances that are much greater than what is typically assumed
as a safe distance from a person recording with a smartphone.
It can potentially imply a serious threat to privacy if UHD-
capable surveillance cameras and smartphones become com-
monly used in public spaces.
To better understand and quantify the degree to which a
UHD camera is privacy-threatening, we conducted subjec-
tive experiments evaluating privacy intrusiveness of UHD and
compared it with HD and SD video. The sequences from the
UHD dataset were resized to HD (1920×1080 pixels) and SD
(720× 404 pixels) resolutions. Privacy evaluation methodol-
ogy proposed in [2] was adapted to the specific surveillance
scenarios of the dataset. Subjective evaluations were con-
1The dataset can be downloaded here: http://mmspg.epfl.ch/pevid-uhd
Fig. 1: Video frame examples from the PEViD-UHD dataset.
ducted using a professional reference UHD Sony Trimaster
SRM-L560 monitor and 20 naı¨ve subjects took part in the
evaluations.
In summary, the contribution of this paper is twofold: (i)
it proposes the first UHD video dataset for evaluation of pri-
vacy issues in video surveillance, and (ii) it presents subjec-
tive study of the quantitative impact on privacy of UHD video
when compared to HD and SD video.
In the rest of the paper, the UHD video dataset for privacy
evaluations is described in details, including the scenarios,
capture process, and annotations, followed by the presenta-
tion of subjective evaluation and discussion of the results on
how much UHD video is more privacy intrusive when com-
pared to HD and SD video.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
There are many datasets for evaluation of video analytics,
such as various detection, recognition, and tracking algo-
rithms. The most notable datasets include FERET dataset2
and Labeled Faces in the Wild (LWF)3 for evaluation of
face detection and recognition algorithms, as well as several
datasets representing different video surveillance scenarios,
such as VIRAT4, CAVIAR5, ChokePoint6 and PETS 20077.
2http://www.itl.nist.gov/iad/humanid/feret/feret master.html
3http://vis-www.cs.umass.edu/lfw/
4http://www.viratdata.org/
5http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/rbf/CAVIARDATA1/
6http://itee.uq.edu.au/ uqywong6/chokepoint.html
7http://pets2007.net/
But as these datasets were not designed with privacy issues
in mind, they are not suitable for the evaluation of privacy
protection filters or testing other privacy related aspects.
There is one existing video dataset specifically designed
for evaluation of privacy and privacy protection tools, called
PEViD [1]. This dataset is used in Visual Privacy Task of Me-
diaEval benchmarking initiative8 in 2013 and 2014 for evalua-
tion of visual privacy protection tools. The proposed PEViD-
UHD dataset is created following similar design principles
that were used to build PEViD dataset with the main differ-
ence that PEViD contains only HD video sequences.
One of the main purposes of a dataset for privacy eval-
uations is to assess visual privacy protection tools. There
are many methods for privacy protection. The simplest ones
rely on visual distortion of the pixels of sensitive regions or
on replacement of faces in a video frame with some sim-
ple shapes. For instance, in [3] people’s identities are pro-
tected by obscuring their faces with a colored ellipse. Other
naı¨ve approaches also include blurring, pixelization, or mask-
ing for hiding the faces of people in video. More complex
distortion-based methods include technique for obscuring the
whole body silhouettes [4], which is based on edge and mo-
tion models, or a complete removal of the silhouette of the
moving person from the scene to hide identity [5]. Aiming to
avoid constraints of the distortion-based methods, more ad-
vanced reversible and secure scrambling-based privacy filters
are proposed in [6] and [7]. These techniques are based on
randomized (seeded with a secret key) modifications of the
8http://www.multimediaeval.org/
Table 1: Summary of the different video sequences in PEViD-UHD dataset.
Environment Scenario Gender & Race Accessories Videos
indoor, day
walking woman: white; man: asian bracelet, scarf 2
fighting woman: white; man: white scarf, bag, necklace, glasses 3
exchanging bag woman: white; man: white, asian glasses, paper bag, backpack 3
stealing woman: white; man: white, asian student card, glasses, phone,money 4
outdoor, day
walking woman: white; man: white, asian glasses, beard, phone 5
fighting man: white none 1
exchanging bag woman: white; man: white, asian glasses, paper bag, backpack 3
stealing woman: white; man: white glasses, phone, money 5
compressed video stream that reversibly obscure privacy sen-
sitive regions. In privacy through Invertible Cryptographic
Obscuration (PICO) [8] facial pixels are encrypted in order
to conceal identity. The process is reversible for authorized
users in possession of a secret encryption key. The idea of
encrypting or scrambling face regions has also been proposed
in [9] and [10], where the focus is on the compression based
encryption mechanism. Secure methods based on geometrical
transformations [11, 12] were also developed recently boast-
ing the independence of compression encoders.
Proposed UHD dataset together with the results of sub-
jective evaluations can be used for benchmarking of privacy
protection tools and filters in the context of UHD, HD, and
SD video. Therefore, the proposed dataset can be of a great
interest to the research community, and it provides a quan-
tifiable assessment of the impact of privacy as a function of
video resolution.
3. DATASET DETAILS
Datasets for evaluation of video analytics in video surveil-
lance and datasets for evaluation of visual privacy protection
tools should both contain typical video surveillance scenarios.
However, there are few differences from typical surveillance
dataset that a dataset for privacy protection should further in-
clude:
• Wide range of practical surveillance scenarios. This is
as opposed to typical surveillance datasets where some
specific conditions are assumed for evaluation of a par-
ticular video analysis algorithm, such as face recogni-
tion;
• Emphasis on personal visual information and its vari-
ety. It should not include just a facial information but
also sufficient content on different races, genders, per-
sonal items and accessories, etc.;
• The means to select different privacy regions for differ-
ent evaluation scenarios.
• Video of high quality, so the sensitive privacy regions
are clearly visible if unprotected. Video analytics are
expected to perform well under such conditions, which
challenges privacy protection tools.
In this paper, we focus on event detection scenarios when one
or two people are engaged in an activity (fighting, walking,
stealing, etc.). Crowd analysis and crowd surveillance is out
of the scope of the paper.
3.1. Dataset description
Following the above principles, we created a UHD video
dataset for privacy evaluation (see Figure 1 for screenshot
examples). In total, 26 video sequences of 4K UHD frame
resolution 3840 × 2160 pixels were recorded at 30 fps. Each
sequence was cut to 13 seconds to keep it long enough to show
a particular scenario but short enough, so it can be easily used
in subjective evaluations. All video sequences were recorded
using a Samsung Galaxy Note 3 smartphone. The goal was
not to record a high quality video, as it is done for evalua-
tion of compression algorithms, but to obtain realistic video
that can be potentially used in surveillance. The resulted
video was therefore degraded with some blurring and color
correction artifacts due to the significant post-processing and
compression performed by the acquisition system.
Several typical indoor and outdoor video surveillance sce-
narios were considered, such as simple walking (1 partici-
pant), stealing (2 participants), exchanging a bag (2 partici-
pants), and fighting (2 participants). Most of the participants
in dataset recording were students from EPFL campus. A spe-
cific effort was made to ensure the variety of gender, race, and
different personal accessories that people carried or wore. All
various scenarios contained in the dataset are summarized in
Table 1.
A subset containing 20 video sequences of the dataset was
annotated using ViPER-GT annotation tool9. For every video,
frame-by-frame annotations for each person was performed
manually to record the silhouette of the moving person. All
annotations were stored in flexible XML format. Each anno-
tation file also included information about video format, such
as resolution, frame rate, and the total number of frames.
9http://viper-toolkit.sourceforge.net/docs/gt/
Table 2: Questions asked during the assessment (left column) and the choice of answers (right column).
Question Choice of answers
1. Which accessory does the person in the red box wear? Glasses, Beard, Bracelet, Sunglasses, Watch, Scarf,
Necklace, None of the above
2. How certain are you about what the person wears? Very sure, Sure, Neutral, Not so sure, Unsure
3. Which item do you see in the video? Student Card, Credit card, Phone, Paper bag, Plastic bag,
Backpack, Money, None of the above
4. How certain are you about the item you saw? Very sure, Sure, Neutral, Not so sure, Unsure
5. What is the main action shown in the video? Walking, Running, Stealing, Dancing, Exchanging bags,
Fighting, No action
6. How certain are you about the main action? Very sure, Sure, Neutral, Not so sure, Unsure
7. What is the gender of the person in the red box? Male, Female, I don’t know
8. What is the race of the person in the red box? White, African, Asian, I don’t know
Besides following general principles of designing a video
dataset for privacy evaluation, UHD dataset should highlight
and emphasize the difference that UHD brings in terms of
privacy intrusiveness when compared to HD or SD resolu-
tion. Therefore, special care was devoted to record UHD
video sequences in such a way that demonstrates this differ-
ence. Therefore, Modulation Transfer Function (MTF) was
computed for the screenshot of ISO 12233 Test Chart defined
in [13] in UHD, HD, and SD resolutions. The obtained val-
ues of MTF function, which is 1317 LW/PH for UHD, 852
LW/PH for HD, and 660 LW/PH for SD when recording with
Samsung Galaxy Note 3, allowed us to estimate ranges of
frequencies that are visible in UHD but not in HD or SD.
Based on these estimations, we computed the distances range
at which the scene should be shot, so the important details
are still visible in UHD but not necessarily visible in other
resolutions.
The UHD video dataset was created in such a way to al-
low the evaluation of different aspects and definitions of pri-
vacy (race, gender, face information, accessories- and gait-
based personal infromation) independently, as well as jointly,
by using either objective or subjective tests. In accordance to
European and Swiss laws and best practices, each participant
in the shooting of the video sequences have read and signed a
consent, allowing for the obtained sequences to be freely used
for research purposes.
4. SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS
To better understand the degree to which an UHD video im-
pacts privacy intrusiveness when compared to lower resolu-
tions, we conducted subjective experiments comparing pri-
vacy intrusiveness of UHD to HD and SD video. The se-
quences from the UHD dataset were resized to HD (1920 ×
1080 pixels) and SD (720 × 404 pixels) resolutions and they
were evaluated using the methodology proposed in [2] and
extended in [14].
Fig. 2: Experimental setup in the lab.
4.1. Evaluation Methodology
An important issue to resolve when evaluating the same type
of content in different resolutions was the memory effect dur-
ing viewing. If an observer first watches UHD video with
the highest level of details, it will affect the evaluation of the
same content in HD resolution, even if not all details are vis-
ible in HD. Therefore, to avoid the memory effect, subjects
first viewed all video sequences in SD (the least number of
visible details), followed by HD, and finally by UHD. Hence,
the test was divided into three separate sessions correspond-
ing to their resolutions.
A total of 20 naı¨ve subjects took part in the experiments,
with 25% being female and overall age ranging from 18 to 27
years old. The test was planned over one entire day, with 7
time slots. Each time slot was attended by 3 subjects. A short
training of the subjects of each group was conducted before
the first test session to explain the experiment and how to use
the evaluation software. Subjects were provided with iPads to
answer the evaluation questions for each video. All subjects
were tested for correct visual acuity and color vision using
Snellen and Ishihara charts.
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Fig. 3: Correct answers to the questions.
Test consisted of three sessions of 15 minutes each (SD,
HD, and UHD content) with a few minutes breaks in-between.
During each session, subjects assessed 20 video sequences of
13 in duration. Test subjects were then given 30 seconds to
answer questions reported in Table 2. The questions can be
viewed as measuring privacy and intelligibility (or usefulness)
of each video. Questions about personal accessories, gen-
der, and race are privacy related questions, since they expose
personal information. Questions about carried items and the
main action are related to intelligibility. In the ‘useful’ video
content where privacy is protected, privacy related questions
should yield small number of correct answers, whereas high
number of correct answers is expected for intelligibility ques-
tions.
For each group and session, video sequences were pre-
sented in a randomized order. Video was played on a 56-inch
professional high performance Sony Trimaster SRM-L560
4K/QFHD LCD reference monitor. Viewing conditions for
the participating subjects were set according to recommenda-
tion ITU-R BT.2022 [15] and the evaluations were performed
in the testing laboratory, which fulfills the recommendations
for subjective evaluation of visual data issued by ITU-R [16].
Figure 2 shows the testing laboratory and how the subjective
evaluations were performed. The high quality monitor was
used for the subjective evaluation, because the monitor can
accurately reproduce the captured video and, therefore, the
experimental setup does not have influence on the evaluation
results. This is a reasonable approach, since the study does
not focus on the influence of display technology on privacy,
but on the influence of the increased capturing resolution.
5. RESULTS
Figure 3 shows percentages of correct answers that sub-
jects gave to the content-related questions, i.e., questions
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Fig. 4: Answers, for which subjects were certain.
1 (‘Accessory’), 3 (‘Item’), 5 (‘Action’), 7 (‘Gender’), and
8 (‘Race’) presented in Table 2. Answers for different video
resolutions are grouped together for each question. From
the figure, it is clear that the number of correct answers for
the same question is different for UHD, HD, and SD video.
Subjects had easier time recognizing actions shown in the
video and gender of the specified person, but it was harder
for them to identify accessories and items. These results are
expected, since accessories and items are small in size and
it is more difficult to see them, while human visual system
is highly sensitive to motion and distinguishing body sil-
houettes, which is how gender can be judged from the far
distance. It is interesting to note that race was one of the
hardest to identify, especially in SD video. It shows that race
recognition depends on the visibility of finer details.
Considering privacy implications, Figure 3 shows that
UHD video is much more privacy intrusive, even when a
smartphone with a low quality sensor was used to record the
video. This is especially the case for the questions that need
more visible details to answer correctly.
The certainty of the subjects when answering different
content-related questions (see questions 1, 2, and 3 in Table 2)
was also checked and the results are illustrated by Figure 4.
The figure shows only those answers, for which the subjects
were certain, i.e., they answered ‘Sure’ or ‘Very sure’. The
answers are grouped according to the question to highlight the
differences between SD, HD, and UHD. Some of the certain
answers were incorrect and some were correct as indicated by
different colors of the bars.
From the Figure 4, it can be noted that subjects tend to
make a ‘leap of faith’ and guess the answer, hence the high
number of incorrect answers were given when there were not
enough visible details to make a clear judgement. For in-
stance, in the figure, ‘Accessory’ bar corresponding to SD res-
olution shows that the number of people who are certain and
incorrect is higher than the number of people who are certain
and correct. It means that more people were sure that they
see some accessory (e.g., a phone or a wallet), while, in fact,
they saw it wrongly. The reason for such bold judgment is a
very little number of visible details in SD resolution, so many
people ‘guess’ incorrectly. Basically, in an uncertain situa-
tion, more people tend to make a certain guess anyway. This
finding implies that in practical surveillance systems, which
often capture video footage at low quality, a human guard in
an uncertain situation may incorrectly mistreat a person based
on personal feelings even if video does not clearly implicate
the person.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper presents the first public UHD video dataset de-
signed for evaluation of visual privacy. In addition to UHD,
the dataset also contains HD and SD versions of the same
content and annotations of body silhouettes. Data from the
subjective evaluation of the impact of UHD on privacy is also
included in the dataset. The evaluation results show that UHD
is a privacy intrusive technology and public needs to be more
aware of the capability of this technology to capture finer vi-
sual details at large distances.
The presented dataset allows flexibility to perform objec-
tive and subjective evaluations for different types of privacy
protection tools. It can be used for deeper analysis of UHD
related privacy intrusiveness or for benchmarking of privacy
protection filters.
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